Repository | Book | Chapter

COPR BookmarkLink
202744

(1980) Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer.

A semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity

Paul Gochet

pp. 45-59

In De Interpretatione Aristotle states a necessary condition for the application of the word "proposition". He writes: "We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity".1

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_4

Full citation:

Gochet, P. (1980). A semantic definition of proposition in terms of truth and falsity, in Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 45-59.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.