Repository | Book | Chapter

The works of Michel Foucault have had an extraordinary influence in sociology, history, literary studies, cultural studies - and in some cases even philosophy. Despite this it will be argued here that one of Foucault's central doctrines exhibits many of the features, and thus the defects, of the sociology of science discussed in Part II. However his terminology and his emphasis on different factors such as power set him apart as a distinctive theoretician. Much of the commentary on Foucault is hagiographical. In part this is due to some quite pervasive obscurities that few commentators attempt to clarify while supporting Foucault's general stance. But it is also in part due to the contagious mistrust of notions like truth and rationality in Foucault. His attack upon such notions has strongly influenced the postmodernist rejection of so-called "enlightenment" intellectual values by his followers. But much of this, as will be argued, is simply mistaken. The mistake is in part due to an over-inflated account of what these "enlightenment" values might be, along with a poverty-stricken view of what are the current accounts of rationality in science and elsewhere (see chapter 1), and a failure to recognise the normativity of knowledge. In turning off the lights of the "enlightenment", Foucault and his followers manage to undercut the very basis of their own doctrines. We need not turn to any "enlightenment" philosophers for an account of what these values might be; but some idea can be gleaned from the discussions in Part I of knowledge and our epistemic values, particularly chapter 1 where the idea of a critical tradition concerning science is outlined.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0289-9_9

Full citation: