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(1999) Cartesian meditations, Dordrecht, Springer.

Conclusion

Edmund Husserl

pp. 151-157

In the investigations of this meditation and already in those of the two preceding meditations, we have been moving within the realm of transcendental experience, of self-experience proper and experience of someone else. We have trusted transcendental experience because of its originarily lived-through evidence; and similarly we have trusted the evidence of predicative description and 1 all the other modes of evidence belonging to transcendental science. Meanwhile we have lost sight of the demand, so seriously made at the beginning — namely that an apodictic knowledge, as the only "genuinely scientific" knowledge,2 be achieved; but we have by no means dropped it. Only we preferred / to sketch in outline the tremendous wealth of problems belonging to the first stage of phenomenology— a stage which in its own manner is itself still infected with a certain naïveté (the naïveté of apodicticity) but contains the great and most characteristic accomplishment of phenomenology, as a refashioning of science on a higher level — instead of entering into the further and ultimate problems of phenomenology: those pertaining to its self-criticism, which aims at determining not only the range and limits but also the modes of apodicticity.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9997-8_7

Full citation:

Husserl, E. (1999). Conclusion, in Cartesian meditations, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 151-157.

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