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I think it rather obvious that an important dualism runs through the literature of both philosophy and sociology in respect of problems of human action. There exists, of course, a great deal of philosophical literature devoted to the explication or analysis of action, much of it influenced by the writings of the later Wittgenstein. The action philosophers have given a great deal of attention to the concept of action itself, and to intentions, reasons and motives. But they have paid very little heed to the unintended consequences of action, in the manner in which such consequences are of concern to social theory. Thus, in a well-known discussion, Donald Davidson analyses the following issue: I move a switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and at the same time alert a prowler. Davidson's concern, as in the case of other philosophers who have discussed this and many other similar examples, is confined to questions of action-description: do I do four things, or only one thing that can be described in four different ways? Without wishing to deny the interest and significance of problems of action-description, it can be pointed out that Davidson's discussion is characteristic of the vast majority of philosophical analyses of action, which limit their concerns to what might be called "the production of action" on the part of actors.

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-86056-2_3

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