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(2001) The invisible origins of legal positivism, Dordrecht, Springer.
Why do jurists and officials consider certain norms/rules as legally binding? How is it possible for officials to insist that their role is not to question the political wisdom or substantive moral content of norms/rules? Why do lawyers and judges, to be more specific, observe from the sidelines, as it were, as if their norms/rules were impersonal and their decisions distanced?
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0808-2_4
Full citation:
Conklin, W.E. (2001). The tradition of legal positivism in modern legal thought, in The invisible origins of legal positivism, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 57-71.
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