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(2010) Synthese 173 (1).
This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch’s paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch’s paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that p even if it is metaphysically impossible for anyone to know that p, and that recognizing this fact provides the resources to solve Fitch’s paradox.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9676-8
Full citation:
Fara, M. (2010). Knowability and the capacity to know. Synthese 173 (1), pp. 53-73.
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