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(2009) Synthese 167 (2).
Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues of ‘factual’ versus ‘procedural’ information, or ‘statics’ versus ‘dynamics’. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really tell us about information? How does its view relate to its ‘cousin’ epistemic logic? We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent protocol models for dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9408-5
Full citation:
van Benthem, J. (2009). The information in intuitionistic logic. Synthese 167 (2), pp. 251-270.
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