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Fictions in legal science

the strange case of the basic norm

pp. 533-542

If the presence of fiction in natural sciences is sufficiently known and accepted, the same doesn't seem to be the case when it comes to legal science. The presence of fictions in Law is unquestioned and can be traced since Roman law, even if its legitimacy remains a matter of great divergence among critics. However, the legitimacy of the use of fictions by natural sciences or Philosophy is attested by famous examples of thought experiments, for instance. Considering this context, we will analyze the use of fictions made by a special kind of science dealing with the regulation of our behavior, namely legal science.Our aim is to analyze the use of fiction by the legal science under the light of the legal theory proposed by Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), especially concerning his proposal that the legitimization of the whole positive legal system is based on a fiction, called the Basic Norm (Grundnorm). The difference, we sustain, is that this "norm" must be seen as a methodological or scientific tool, and not as an ordinary norm among others in the legal system. We will try to elucidate how can a fiction display such an important function and still preserve the "principle of purity" of the kelsenian legal theory.

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Full citation:

(2016)., Fictions in legal science: the strange case of the basic norm, in J. Redmond, O. Martins & Ã. Fernández (eds.), Epistemology, knowledge and the impact of interaction, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 533-542.

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