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"Having a theory of mind" is often invoked to explain remarkable abilities in social cognition, but in reality this is little more than a re-description of the data, a challenge for theorists to understand what it really means, and how we—and perhaps some other species—evolved those abilities. I argue that these abilities most likely grew out of an understanding of action, and in particular that the key first step was the evolution, by shared ancestors of modern humans and the living great apes, of an ability to parse the skilled actions of others. Parsing organized, goal-directed behaviour allows the intention of the model to be 'seen" (as the typical result which terminates action), and the cause-effect relations in the steps of the process to be 'seen" (as the sequence and coordination of actions necessary for that result to be achieved). In contrast, reasoning about true intentionality and true causality may depend on possession of language, and be of relatively minor usefulness in everyday interactions.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-2336-8_8

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