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with Atkinson David (1999). Probability as a theory dependent concept. Synthese, 118 (3), 307-328. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005242414754.

with Atkinson David (2006). Probability all the way up. Synthese, 153 (2), 187-197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2723-1.

with Atkinson David (2011). Grounds and limits: Reichenbach and foundationalist epistemology. Synthese, 181 (1), 113-124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9586-9.

(2012). A case of confusing probability and confirmation. Synthese, 184 (1), 101-107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9692-8.

with Fitelson Branden, Douven Igor (2012). Introduction to the special issue: probability, confirmation and fallacies. Synthese, 184 (1), 1-1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9700-z.

with Fitelson Branden, Douven Igor (eds) (2012). Synthese 184 (1).

with Atkinson David (2014). Biased coins a model for higher-order probabilities. In M. C. Galavotti, E. Nemeth & F. Stadler (eds.) European philosophy of science (pp. 241-248). Dordrecht: Springer.

with Wenmackers Sylvia (2014). Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. Synthese, 191 (4), 627-628. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0397-2.

with Wenmackers Sylvia (eds) (2014). Synthese 191 (4).

with Bewersdorf Benjamin (2018). Introduction to the special issue on epistemic justification. Synthese, 195 (9), 3735-3735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1440-x.

with Bewersdorf Benjamin (eds) (2018). Synthese 195 (9).