Phenomenological Reviews

In the field of ethics, reflecting on values is of utmost importance. This reflection gains significance due to the complexity of the multicultural environment in which humanity operates today, characterized by diverse value systems and the varying dominance of specific values across different times and cultures. Moritz von Kalckreuth notes that while the topic of values may seem ‘exotic’ today, it was quite popular at the beginning of the twentieth century, due to the belief that it could introduce a scientific aspect to discussions on meaning and normative evaluations. Within this context, Nicolai Hartmann stands out as one of the few prominent value theorists in German philosophy, and his writings presented here, also embody an existentialist spirit typical of the era. In Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart. Aufsätze zu Wert und Sinn, von Kalckreuth presents a thematically arranged collection of essays by Hartmann, written between 1924 and 1929, all centered on the question of value. The first part of the anthology is specifically devoted to the concept of value, encompassing both moral and aesthetic dimensions, while the second part explores phenomena that cannot be fully explained through purely axiological considerations. These writings serve as a valuable complement to the already remarkable moral treatises found in Hartmann’s major works (Ethik and Das Problem des gesitigen Seins). Published in 1926, Ethik, as von Kalckreuth observes, follows two primary lines of argumentation. Firstly, it examines how values are apprehended, their ontological nature, and provides a detailed account of value phenomena, a topic deeply explored in the second volume (Moral Values). Secondly, it addresses the actions that serve as the practical counterpart to the ideality of values, through which values are actualized by the moral subject. In Das Problem des geistigen Seins, the study on values is situated within a cultural-historical framework, where morality is portrayed as a domain of the objective spirit, facilitating interaction among individuals. That said, Hartmann’s theory of values is deeply intertwined with the intellectual debates of the past century and is part of a broader philosophical endeavor aimed at revitalizing ontology by incorporating insights from other fields of knowledge, striving to establish a shared ontological foundation. It would be therefore incorrect to assume that Hartmann’s axiological theory is confined solely to his 1926 Ethik. As evidenced by his correspondence with Heinz Heimsoeth, Hartmann had already developed several theoretical principles underpinning his moral reflections, before the First World War. This assumption is plausible, given that the overarching structure of Hartmann’s philosophy is evident even in his early works. In particular, Hartmann’s axiology takes its starting point in the Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, where he lays out the gnoseological and ontological conditions of his theory of values, showing that the latter cannot prescind from ontology; indeed, reflection on moral phenomena is part of it as “a regional ontology, an investigation of the ontological structure of the person in its complexity as a multi-layered entity”^[1]. As von Kalckreuth highlights, amidst the diverse voices shaping the debate on the question of values—such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Max Scheler, and Max Weber, among others—Hartmann, with his approach, seeks to unify philosophical research on values, which is otherwise marked by a tendency toward one-sidedness. If Ethik—which today’s reception is limited to—is not regarded as the sole text for understanding Hartmann’s axiological framework, the significance of von Kalckreuth’s collection emerges as a valuable contribution to the study of the philosophy of value.  

At this point, it may be helpful to outline the themes and questions that Hartmann engages with in the realm of a philosophy of values, where the solutions he developed continue to serve as essential reference points for axiological reflection. To better understand Hartmann’s stance within the debate of his time, it is interesting to examine his first essay, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, which, despite its brevity, serves as a highly insightful declaration of his intentions and methodology. In it, Hartmann underscores that, despite the variety of existing doctrines, the issue of values has matured into a distinct philosophical problem that should not be conflated with the question of purposes. Additionally, there are key issues that no philosophy of value can overlook: the notion that life is rich with value, the call to honor the values inherent in the world, and the duty to actualize them—these latter two principles delineate the entire domain of ethics. Starting with the essence of the values, Hartmann identifies a series of issues, that are explored and addressed in this anthology. In the axiological theories developed between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, questions surrounding pluralism and relativism of values took center stage. Hartmann directly challenges Nietzsche, who, by highlighting the variety of values and advocating for their transvaluation, rendered pluralism and ontology incompatible. Pluralism plays a central role in Hartmann’s reflections and stems from his unique phenomenological approach, which emphasizes a maximum focus on the given data and a minimum of metaphysics, rejecting any form of unilateral Standpünktlichkeit. This perspective also applies to values, as seen in Ethik, published nearly contemporaneously with Weber’s concept of a ‘polytheism of values’, which, at its core, arises from similar needs to those of the philosopher from Riga. Hartmann’s theory of values can be seen as addressing the questions left unresolved by Nietzsche. He manages to mantain an ontological framework while embracing the pluralism of values, driven by the ‘tension toward the universal’, that defines his philosophical inquiry. In this respect,  his approach might be referred to as an ‘ontology of values’.

Hartmann’s original theses engage with and confront tradition, and Nietzsche is not the only interlocutor in this collection. In Kants Metaphysik der Sitten und die Ethik unserer Tage, Hartmann aims to place his reflections within the broader context of the ‘Material Ethics of Value’, a framework pioneered by Max Scheler where Hartmann himself emerges as a prominent figure. This theory can be seen as a synthesis, combining Nietzsche’s discovery of the multiplicity of values with Kant’s apriorism and the author repeatedly highlights its innovative nature, emphasizing how it resolves several aporias, that earlier moral theories failed to tackle. In this essay, Hartmann underscores particularly the capacity of the Material Ethics of Value to handle the diversity of good—something that has become fundamental since Nietzsche. He acknowledges that while our preferences for accessing values may shift, there are laws that remain applicable a priori. This discussion unfolds, as the title suggests, in the context of a comparison with Kantian Ethics. Demonstrating a more accommodating stance toward the philosopher of Königsberg than many of his contemporaries, Hartmann acknowledges Kant’s achievement in addressing the ethical problem through the lens of apriorism. However, he critiques this perspective, which identifies the explanatory principle of moral phenomena as an intrinsic tendency of the subject, arguing that it succumbs to the subjectivism that deeply taints modern philosophy. The Hartmannian solution lies in rejecting the subjective origin of moral phenomena; this is achieved by affirming the existence of an “ideal realm of being, to which values intrinsically belong”. These values are apprehended a priori as “autonomous entities within this realm, entirely independent of  ‘experience’”^[2]. Hartmann’s perspective closely aligns with that of Scheler, who criticized the formalism and intellectualism of Kantian Ethics. To move beyond intellectualism, both Scheler and Hartmann recognize the presence of an axiological sentiment (Wertgefühl), which serves as the primary locus of the givenness of values. This sentiment, inherent in every human decision, represents the true essence of moral phenomena. Regarding Kantian formalism, Hartmann, while resonating with Scheler, states: “Values themselves do not inherently possess the nature of laws or imperatives […] in relation to the subject, but rather exist as material and objective entities, although not as real ones”^[3]. This is why ethics, building on Kantian apriorism, must evolve into a Material Ethics of Values. It is clear then, that Scheler’s remarkable contribution lies in revealing the existence of material and objective entities whose value is evident a priori. According to Hartmann, this discovery paves the way for an expansive field of inquiry into ethical apriorism, which had previously been insufficiently explored. Furthermore, it reveals that Kantian Ethics and Material Value Ethics fundamentally share the same trajectory.

Closely related to the issue of value pluralism is another crucial problem: reconciling the ‘ideal self-existence’ of values with relativism (an aspect, the second, that Nietzsche’s philosophy brought starkly into focus). As Hartmann observes in Vom Wesen sittlicher Forderungen, the flaw in nearly all moral systems throughout history prior to Nietzsche, lies in their tendency to elevate a specific value as an absolute good in itself. In contrast, it is essential to illuminate the relativity of values. What, then, is the source of this relativity? The questionable nature of values arises from their inability to independently determine human will. They exist autonomously, separate from their actual realization, and in relation to reality, they present only a demand—a call to what ought to be. The ideal nature of values necessitates a moment of mediation between ideality and reality, between moral experience and axiological objectivity. Here, personal being assumes a pivotal role as the mediator between the ideal realm of values and the realities that define world events and human existence. This being has the ability to bring ideal demands into the world and, within its capabilities, transform what already exists; it is entrusted with the responsibility of being a co-creator of the world. Thus, the issue of relativism can be reinterpreted as follows: it is not the values themselves, in their essence, that change, but rather their validity in relation to the moral subject and the axiological consciousness. This consciousness is distinct from theoretical consciousness and does not follow a linear progression of development.  At the individual level, value blindness, or Wertblindheit, which leads to favoring one value while disregarding others, results from a significant limitation of the axiological consciousness. The latter is gripped by the value and, in a way, compelled to respond to it. Each value tends to dominate individuals, often overshadowing other values—a phenomenon particularly pronounced in history, where a ‘one-sided ethos’ periodically prevails. Hartmann successfully bridges the intrinsic nature of values with relativism, through the concept of validity. Here, what emerges is a dynamic and adaptable validity, intrinsically tied to circumstances and aligned with evolving ways of life^[4]. The moral demands that shape our lives and guide our will are intrinsically tied to real relationships and the lived world, rather than being mere flatus vocis. As Hartmann elaborates in the essay, these demands arise where instincts fail humanity; unlike animals, humans are not naturally equipped with the skills necessary for survival. Instead, they find themselves entangled in an “infinite chain of situations”^[5], compelled to make free decisions at every turn. Only in these moments, do humans become truly capable of action. In contrast to the traditional systematic error, which separates what is given from what is ideally required, Hartmann’s proposed middle path—linking moral demands to real-world structures—finds an ally in Aristotle’s doctrine of situation types as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.

In Die Wertdimensionen der Nickomachischen Ethik, Hartmann engages in a historical and systematic analysis of Aristotle’s theory of virtue, juxtaposing it with contemporary philosophy of value. He challenges “the notion that ethics of virtue merely involves advocating outdated virtues and applying them case-by-case”^[6]. In light of Nietzsche’s concept of a multiplicity of values—contrasting with the unity proposed by Platonic and Kantian philosophies—the ancient doctrine of the multiplicity of virtues has regained significance. Aristotle focused on a value that is valid and recognizable to human beings. For him, the nature of value was defined by the structure of being in different areas of life, reflecting the natural link between value and reality. Aristotle did not entirely discard Plato’s concept of innate ideas of virtues or their autonomy. Instead, he illustrated their connection to the actual structures of human life. It is then the responsibility of individuals to determine how to navigate various situations, and it is the nature of these specific human contexts that dictates the range of possible behaviors associated with each virtue. The Aristotelian theory of value, aligning with the Hartmannian thesis and the Greek ideal of mesotes, addresses ethical relativism. Values are neither purely subjective nor unyieldingly absolute; they are influenced by the framework of human existence and the historical contexts that guide their development. The strength of this essay lies in its effort to tackle an unresolved question posed by Aristotle: “How can one identify the appropriate balance between the incorrect extremes, and what means does an individual possess in their life to ensure that their actions align with the ideal?”^[7]. According to Hartmann, the sense of value identified by the phänomenologischen Wertphilosophie^[8] serves as an example of orientation within various areas of existence and life, as it allows one to experience a value as either positive or negative.

Hartmann revisits the relationship between reality and ideality also in his 1938 writing, Zeitlichkeit und Substantialität. In this text, he only apparently departs from the axiological theme, in order to clarify the nature of values. The philosopher examines the history of Western thought, particularly its persistent quest to identify something permanent amidst the passage of time. From Parmenides to Plato, through Christianity, to Kant and beyond, time has been seen as destructive, leading to a preference for immutability. The highest values and meaning have often been connected to eternity. Hartmann emphasizes rather a real and ephemeral dimension of them, which has a “more important role than the ideal values that remain merely schematic”^[9]. This raises the question of how to understand the definition of values as ‘ideal essences’ that Hartmann offers in Ethics.  Hartmann’s acknowledgment of values as ideal entities does not suggest an evasion from reality; like all ideal beings, values maintain a connection with the real world. Specifically, they serve not only as ‘principles of the ideal ethical sphere’ but also as ‘principles of the actual sphere’ and of the ‘practical sphere’[10]. The ethos of humanity is characterized by actions rather than being merely an ideal product. Therefore, the existence of values cannot be reduced to ‘mere essence’; as principles of ethos, their essence transcends the realm of ideal existence and integrates into the changing world of ethical acts. However, the challenge against the populär metaphysischer Substanzbegriff is not limited to values alone; it encompasses the entirety of existence, including personal and ethical beings in their spiritual dimensions. It is relevant, in this context, to connect the 1938 essay with Hartmann’s innovative considerations presented in Philosophie der Natur. Here, the philosopher examines how relative permanence manifests in reality, going beyond the notion of absolute duration. Hartmann differentiates between the concepts of subsistence (Subsistenz) and consistency (Konsistenz), as strategies of relative permanence employed by natural entities. Subsistence represents a static category predominant at the lower levels of natural existence, particularly concerning phenomena related to matter, the preservation of motion, and forms of energy—where inertia and mechanistic organization of formal entities dominate. In contrast, consistency is observed only at the most advanced levels of organic existence and is characterized as a dynamic concept. Because of this trait, living organisms do not rely on a static foundation but persist as procedural forms and are maintained by continuous reaffirmation activities, which enable them to change while preserving their identity. The permanence of the self and the moral person is seen as a specific form of consistency: “Das Ich ist nicht Substanz, aber er hat Konstanz im Wandel seiner Zustände, Akte und Inhalte”^[11]. Within the framework provided by the ontology of nature, personal identity consists of two elements: a center of reaffirmation and time. At each moment of our lives, we are a present self that reaffirms its identity in relation to a set of past selves. In the non-spatial dimension of inner experience, the self can detach from any material element and achieve a higher level of freedom—moral freedom—by deciding the extent to which the present self should remain faithful to the past self. The personal being is not only capable of understanding the vast array of values and realizing them but also uniquely possesses free will, which distinguishes it from other entities. Without freedom, which is the fundamental premise of any ethical system, values would remain unexpressed and unrealized. Therefore, freedom is an essential attribute of the person, who acts as a mediator between values and reality. Hartmann identifies this uniquely human ability to attribute meaning to reality as an expression of human distinctiveness, dignity, and nobility. In this context, although humans may be physically insignificant in the vast universe, their impact is immense. They serve as vehicles “of a higher principle, creators of a reality which possesses significance and value (Schöpfer eines Sinn- und Wertvollen in der Wirklichkeit)”^[12], and as mediators of the highest values in the world.

In Sinngebung und Sinnerfüllung, Hartmann highlights the complex relationship between metaphysical issues of meaning and value, reflecting the existentialist ethos of his time. By providing a comprehensive historical overview of the concept of meaning, Hartmann illustrates how humanity’s relentless search for meaning has driven individuals to transcend empirical boundaries, ultimately surpassing limits of comprehension and making any attempt to fully grasp or understand it unattainable. Hartmann suggests that value does not lie in a primary unit but in the ‘ontologically secondary’, within what is given. This sense of value emerges in the world through epigenesis rather than stemming from foundational principles. In this context, man is inherently tardy because, if meaning existed independently within the world, it could not belong to him. Therefore, humanity carries a profound responsibility, which is intertwined with the capacity to impart meaning. Consequently, a new metaphysics must emerge from the remnants of the old, reinstating mankind’s rightful claim to the world. To support this assertion, the author examines the philosophy of history. Contrary to Hegel’s rational and purposeful interpretation of history, individuals find their place in it through moments of senselessness and randomness. Despite these limitations, humans ascribe meaning to history, which is the process by which humanity unfolds its essence and achieves fulfillment through human actions. As von Kalckreuth states: “This gives an idea of how man’s creative role should be understood”^[13]. In emphasizing the originality and significance of the philosophy of values and the paradigm shift it introduces, Hartmann contends that this approach would uncover a new dimension. The realization of meaning hinges on values, and society’s role is to achieve this through active individual participation.

The anthology edited by Von Kalckreuth, concludes with a discussion that focuses on value and individuality. Hartmann’s speech at the Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía in Mendoza, titled Das Ethos der Persönlichkeit, begins by distinguishing between person and personality. Personality, specifically the value of personality, is what makes individuals unique. It is an irreplaceable trait that contrasts with the concept of personhood, which is shared by all individuals who possess consciousness, the ability to think, ethical sense, and free will. The anthology’s proposal of this speech is noteworthy, as it seeks to revisit the concept of personality as discussed in Ethik. The origin of the value of personality can be attributed to Hartmann’s awareness of the limitations of the category of person; this category, as previously said, identifies human beings as mediators between the realm of values and reality. However, it seems overly broad and fails to capture individual uniqueness, while the concept of personality refers to what is “exceptional and unique in a person”^[14]. Persönlichkeit differs from other values as it presents a normative instance applicable only to specific individuals, involving the personal synthesis each person makes of various values. Although personality possesses an ideal nature independent of the degree of achievement, this value is different from one individual to another. Its content does not apply uniformly to everyone; therefore, personality cannot be defined as universal. Strictly speaking, there is no concept of  ‘personality in general’; rather, it is more accurate to speak of ‘values of personality’. Hartmann faces the paradox that values associated with various personalities (which as ideal entities should be universal) are distinguished by their individuality. The philosopher’s solution emphasizes that the value of personality is both ‘subjectively universal’—meaning it applies to every individual capable of understanding values—and ‘objectively universal’—because the uniqueness of the value of personality lies not in the ideal nature of the value itself, but in its connection to reality. Ultimately, this value is not inherently individual but can be defined as such since it pertains to the person. This represents the “extreme case of the concretion and individualization of valuational matter”^[15]. In Das Ethos der Persönlichkeit, Hartmann revisits the subject, indicating dissatisfaction with the solution he had proposed. Reaffirming the almost inscrutability of a concept that, nonetheless, cannot be unrecognized as true, the author states: “Where there is value, which is not common but which is only of an individual, it is difficult to say. However that it exists […] is not debatable”^[16]. From Hartmann’s perspective, personality values are considered moral values that are indispensable and supreme as they elevate the autonomous character of individuals. In light of this view, Hartmann suggests a significant revision (Umkehrung) of Kant’s categorical imperative, highlighting the importance of respecting individual personalities. Moreover, the value of personality presents a challenge regarding our modes of knowledge; in this context, referring to an intuitive cognitive mode, as we do with other values, is not appropriate.  The value of personality, due to its individuality, stands apart from other values and complicates its aprioric knowledge; it is more sensed than learned, yet in every situation, it emerges as an intuitive guide for our feelings and actions^[17]. Hartmann’s focus on the value of personality stems therefore from his deep commitment to the individual as the cornerstone of ethics. By highlighting each person’s unique and distinctive nature, Hartmann aims to move away from an impersonal ethical framework. He argues that individuality is fundamental in establishing the significance of this value and underscores its importance to the extent that he regards it as the supreme moral value and the core of moral life.

In conclusion, it is pertinent to examine the significance of von Kalckreuth’s editorial selection and how it fits into the ongoing philosophical discourse on values. The anthology revitalizes reflections on the theory of values, which remains highly relevant in an era characterized by widespread reevaluation and significant transformations. The path outlined by the editor effectively highlights the dual aspects of Hartmann’s axiological theory. On one hand, this theory accounts for the historical and cultural dimensions of value, wherein the individual contributes meaning within the flow of a non-teleologically ordered history. On the other hand, it does not overlook what defines a person’s uniqueness, namely the Persönlichkeit. Additionally, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart. Aufsätze zu Wert und Sinn addresses and even enhances key issues in the axiological debates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where it tackles unresolved aporias from Nietzschean reflection, which Hartmann engaged with. Specifically, it explores the relationship between pluralism, relativism, freedom, and the ideality of value, as well as the nature of moral demands and the position of personal beings in relation to the cosmos of values. Within the framework of his Material Ethics of Values, Hartmann successfully conveys an ideal of values coexisting with their multiplicity and reinterprets the apparent relativism of values concerning their relativity to individual and historical axiological consciousness. Consequently, the philosopher upholds personal freedom—a fundamental prerequisite of ethics—realized through the capacity to actualize values and associated with the ability to impart meaning to the world. Focusing now specifically on today’s debate on values and phenomena associated with them, the importance of von Kalckreuth’s collection can be emphasized, based on some key points. Unlike contemporary literature, which often fails to precisely differentiate values, it is essential to specify which normative phenomena are considered values to avoid an ‘inflationary concept of value’[18]. In Anglo-Saxon discussions, it is generally accepted that moral values exist, but the question remains whether other types of values also exist, and if so, what they are. Von Kalckreuth also identifies a common approach in contemporary contributions on values, which often conceptualizes values based on the model of moral values. In this regard, Hartmann’s reflections are significant, as he outlines a system of various types of values, which is extensively discussed in the second volume of Ethics, titled Moral Values. A further point emphasized by the editor is that today’s philosophical thinking often lacks a comprehensive cultural, social, and historical frame. While social contexts are acknowledged as important, individual value concepts are frequently analyzed without incorporating cultural perspectives, treating value as a standalone aspect of the individual. Hartmann’s theory, however, suggests that values are connected to historical change and cultural diversity, that “our experience of value occurs within the objective spirit and is therefore influenced by socio-cultural factors”^[19]. A third issue, highlighted by von Kalckreuth, regarding which Hartmannian’s reflections are pertinent in contemporary debate, pertains to the disciplinary classification of the theory of value. The author argues that it is limiting to categorize it solely as metaethics (as is commonly done today), and asserts that Hartmann’s axiology clarifies the broader scope of this theory. Through an analysis of Hartmann’s insights into the differentiation among various types of values, on the inclusion of a socio-cultural reference context for their emergence and on individual phenomena, it becomes evident that there exists “a much broader conception of the philosophy of value, which addresses fundamental issues in ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy”^[20], encompassing philosophical, cultural, and historical considerations. All things said, Von Kalckreuth’s work integrates Hartmann’s theory of values into contemporary discussions, illuminating its unique and original aspects. Hartmann’s strength lies in his ability to act as a mediator rather than positioning himself as an ‘elitist of values’. He demonstrates a commitment to intellectual honesty and an openness to the complexities of reality, which is a hallmark of his philosophical approach that prioritizes Problemdenken. Within this framework, his theory of value should be regarded, as von Kalckreuth notes, as a crucial reference point for any discourse on values.

^[1]C. Scognamiglio, LA PERSONA. Etica e ontologia nella filosofia di Nicolai Hartmann, ebook version.

^[2]N. Hartmann, Ethics, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1932, p. 165.

^[3]Ivi, p. 179.

^[4]See N. Hartmann, Ontologia dei valori, edited by Giuseppe D’Anna, Morcelliana, Brescia 2011, p. 43.

^[5]M. von Kalckreuth, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, cit., p.68.

^[6]Ivi, p. 31.

^[7]Ivi, p. 32.

^[8]Ibidem.

^[9]Ivi, p. 39.

[10]See N. Hartmann, Ethics, pp. 232-241.

^[11]N. Hartmann, Philosophie der Natur. Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre, De Gruyter, Berlin 1950, p. 311.

^[12]N. Hartmann, Ethics, cit., p. 243.

^[13]M. von Kalckreuth, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, cit., p. 36.

^[14]Ivi, p. 263.

^[15]N. Hartmann, Ethics, cit., p. 349.

^[16]M. von Kalckreuth, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, cit., p. 271.

^[17]See P. Martinetti, «La filosofia morale di Nicolai Hartmann», in Rivista di Filosofia ANNO XXVI, Fratelli Bocca Editore, Milano 1935, pp. 1-46, here p. 18.

[18]M. von Kalckreuth, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, cit., p. 42.

^[19]Ivi, p. 45.

^[20]Ivi, p. 46.