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It is not my intent to mount a full-scale defence of deconstruction in reply to the critique offered by Freadman and Miller, much less to offer a defence of Gayatri Spivak: in the first instance becaue I am not sure that I could in any sensible way identify myself as its spokesperson, in the second because Spivak would, no doubt, prefer to speak for herself. Rather, in what follows, I take up two topics that arise from their discussion, both of which might, I think, be usefully re-examined: the characterisation of deconstruction (as "theory', as "practice'), and the nature of interpretation. For my own part, the most interesting issues are raised by the concept of reduction, and the argument that Spivak's work (or deconstructive criticism in general) reductively forces the literary text into an alien discursive universe, while authentic interpretation does not. Much of what follows is critical, so it ought be noted here that I would want to support two major components of the position Freadman and Miller adopt, namely, the belief that interpretation is closely allied to the procedures of ethical decision-making, and the view that it is unlikely that "theory' will deliver the "correct' or "best' interpretation. As will become clear, however, I construe the implications of these beliefs in a manner considerably removed from theirs.

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-21613-0_3

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