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Is it possible to have a philosophical position of realism without essentialist assumptions and residual metaphysics of presence? In this book I develop the position of hermeneutic realism as an affirmative answer to that question. In breaking in a radical manner with the "myth of the given", the hermeneutic realist holds that there is but a meaningful reality. The articulation of meaning within practices is not imposed upon a pre-meaningful (amorphous) reality. This articulation is inextricable from reality. (Hereafter I will also use the expression "meaningful articulation".) In the remainder the profile of hermeneutic realism will often be specified via formulating disclaimers. Here is the first disclaimer: The intrinsic meaningfulness of reality does not need an epistemic subject who intentionally produces meanings embodied in her beliefs, actions, and activities. The meaningfulness of reality preexists and conditions the formation of any kind of epistemic subject. This meaningfulness is neither subjective nor intersubjective. It is trans-subjective. The next disclaimer is that advocating the meaningfulness of reality by stressing the primacy of practices does not imply a form of constructivism. Reality is not constructed by (scientific) practices. Any form of constructivism presupposes the dualism of constructor and constructed qua a version of Cartesian dualism. (Approaches such as actor-network theory and the "empirical ontologies" in SSK are controversial attempts at deconstructing the dualist assumptions of classical social constructivism.)

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-39289-9_1

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