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This introductory chapter discusses the challenge of providing a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality and states the main claim of the book. It delineates the subject matter and limits the scope of the inquiry by explaining why certain expressions which seem to refer to the ability at issue do not really point to the kind of phenomena the book intends to elucidate. Drawing on Max Scheler, I point to a human ability that becomes actualized in situations in which, in an interrelated way, two or more individuals come to understand their emotional feelings as feelings that constitute one and the same experiential act. The discussion emphasizes that any account of collective affective intentionality should offer a principle to differentiate between situations in which the individuals involved are feeling together and situations in which they merely are feeling alongside each other. After addressing the difficulties of reconciling a number of insights gained in the course of different philosophical debates, I suggest that the study of our ability to participate in episodes of joint feeling sheds light on the fundamental issue concerning the kind of beings we humans are. Appealing to a characterization of transcendental arguments offered by Charles Taylor, I explain my way of proceeding which is based on the idea that we can explicate experiential phenomena by specifying their conditions of intelligibility. In closing the chapter, I outline the general structure of the argument to be developed in this book.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33735-7_1

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