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Let us first recapitulate the account developed so far. A human action is analyzable both as an originary causal act of an agent for a desired end via means describable in physical terms, and thus as mediated by a bodily exertion. Actions that are intentional refrainings from movement also involve bodily exertions either not to act so as to maintain a state of affairs or not to interfere with a change of state taking place. As a bodily exertion, an action is subject to multiple descriptions, linked to the causal effects of the action, of which only one is attributable to the agent's end. The exertion need not be in fact visible to an external observer, but it is in principle observable. Two elicited acts are involved in an action: the desire of a possible but currently non-existent end and the choosing the means to that end based on generalized probabilities (beliefs) about their efficacy. The agent cause, which is the bringing about of the change in the thing linked to the means, can be conditioned but in fact cannot be caused, by the elicited acts. They are necessary but not sufficient for it. They constitute the double existentiality of all action.

DOI: 10.1057/9780230355460_8

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