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(2012) Kant, Schopenhauer and morality, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
According to Premise II(b) what is non-phenomenal is metaphysically universal. But, to repeat what was said in the preliminary section of the previous chapter, in claiming that free, and thus non-phenomenal, acts of decision and judgement are universals I certainly do not mean – what would be scarcely intelligible, indeed a category mistake – that they are predicables of the kind apparently denoted by such expressions as "being red", "being a cow", "being to the north of", or "being a person", "being a judgement" and "being a decision", which metaphysical realists about "universals' typically posit as real entities. My contention, rather, is that the non-phenomenality of rationalized acts entails that like such predicables, if there are any, and like such non-predicables as "The Union Jack" or "Beethoven's Fifth", if there are any such things over and above particular flags of a given sort or particular performances of a given symphony, decisions and judgements are multiply realizable or exemplifiable mental acts.
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Walker, M.T. (2012). From non-phenomenality to universality, in Kant, Schopenhauer and morality, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 235-282.
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