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(2012) From justice to protection, Dordrecht, Springer.

Ethics of protection I

theoretical fundaments

Miguel Kottow

pp. 45-54

Ever since Hobbes, and throughout all political philosophies, nation-States are expected to honor the obligation of securing personal, patrimonial, and territorial protection to their subjects. Even libertarian minimal State proponents do not exempt the ruling powers from protecting their citizenry. Philosophers have put protection at the ethical basis of interpersonal relationships, as illustrated by care due to the newborn, future generations (Jonas), and the defenseless Other (Lévinas).Complex societies are bound to provide protection beyond physical harm and patrimonial dispossession. Historically, nation-States have extended their responsibility to provide protection against catastrophes and biological threats such as epidemics and pandemics, and yet have been reticent in providing public medical care.Protection goes beyond the ethics of care that is committed to proximal aid within familial and neighborly relations, for protection is equally due to the marginalized, the disempowered, and the distant destitute. Poverty not being a natural condition, has historical roots of dominance, colonialism, exploitation which need to be repaired.Protection aims to help develop personal and collective autonomy, and should not be confused with paternalism which supplants and often disregards autonomy, especially in its unjustified authoritarian form. Protectionism, which is a policy aimed at safeguarding interests, is also distinct from an ethics that aims at protecting the weak.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-2026-2_5

Full citation:

Kottow, M. (2012). Ethics of protection I: theoretical fundaments, in From justice to protection, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 45-54.

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