Jean-Louis Chrétien: Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath

Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath Book Cover Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath
Kalos
Jean-Louis Chrétien. Translated by Steven DeLay. Foreword by Emmanuel Housset
Wipf and Stock Publishers
2024
Paperback
126

Reviewed by: Dr Angelo Bottone
(Dublin Business School)

In Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath, Jean-Louis Chrétien (1952-2019) focuses on ten ordinary words which are also “decisive in the spiritual tradition,” as he explains in the Preface. Each word is a path, and in questioning them, Chrétien does not seek to master or define them, but rather to let them speak, to allow their resonance, their biblical, philosophical, and poetic echoes to unfold. The act of meditating on these words becomes a form of attentive listening, where language itself is received as a gift and thinking takes the form of response.

Originally published in 2009 under the title Pour reprendre et perdre haleine: dix brèves méditations, this is the first time the work has been translated into a foreign language.

The ten terms Chrétien explores are: breath (souffle), way (chemin), temptation (tentation), attention (attention), recollection (recueillement), blessing (bénédiction), peace (paix), gentleness (douceur), abandonment (abandon), and wound (blessure).

Each meditation may be read in isolation, but Chrétien suggests considering them as a progression that moves from the most general, breath, which also inspires the book’s title, to the most specific, wound, a theme he has explored in other works such as La joie spacieuse (2007). The trajectory is not linear or developmental in the traditional sense, but contemplative and intensifying: beginning with the elemental experience of breathing, Chrétien gradually draws the reader deeper into the vulnerabilities of human existence, until reaching the wound as the place where all previous themes converge. The wound, in Chrétien’s thought, is never merely a mark of suffering; it is a place of encounter, where fragility becomes the threshold of transcendence. Chrétien approaches these words with reverence and vulnerability, seeking not to explain them from without but to dwell with them from within, allowing the voice of tradition and the fragility of human existence to illuminate their hidden depths.

Chrétien’s style in these ten meditations (“brief meditations” in the original title Pour reprendre et perdre haleine: dix brèves méditations, published in 2009) is deliberately slow, poetic, and resonant. It resists systematic exposition and instead unfolds through a kind of contemplative circling, like a long-breathed conversation, in a low voice. This stylistic choice is not incidental; it mirrors the very rhythm of breath that structures the book: the inhalation of silent attention, and the exhalation of praise, surrender, or poetic invocation. Chrétien writes with what might be called a phenomenological lyricism. His prose blends philosophical reflection with scriptural allusion, patristic echoes, and poetic imagery, weaving a polyphony of voices such as Saint Teresa of Avila, Malebranche, Silesius, Dante, Kierkegaard, and above all Augustine, into a living tapestry of meaning. The result is a form of writing that is as much addressed to the heart as to the intellect. It invites not just interpretation, but inhabitation. One reads slowly, contemplatively, letting the words breathe rather than submitting them to conceptual closure. In this way, the style itself becomes a spiritual exercise: the reader must pause, attend, and receive, echoing the very structure of prayer that the book so gently evokes.

Chrétien’s dialogue with Augustine is particularly vital. Augustine is not merely cited but becomes a kind of subterranean guide. Chrétien draws on Augustine’s notion of the inner word (verbum mentis) and the dilated heart of Psalm 119 to articulate a theology of interiority oriented toward generosity and praise. The voice, for both Augustine and Chrétien, is where the soul becomes manifest, and the dilation of the heart signals the soul’s readiness to respond to God. In this way, Chrétien’s meditations do not simply echo Augustine; they translate Augustinian insight into phenomenological attentiveness.

“This book aims to be European,” Chrétien specifies in the Preface. In fact, each term is often explored in its semantic variations across major European languages, primarily French, but also Latin, German, Spanish, English, and Italian. Chrétien is attentive not only to etymology but to the spiritual and poetic nuance each linguistic tradition carries. For example, in the meditation on attention, the resonance of the Latin attendere (to stretch toward) contrasts subtly with the modern English “to attend,” which has lost its meaning of “waiting” while retaining that of vigilance and assistance. This philological sensitivity is never merely scholarly; it serves Chrétien’s larger spiritual and phenomenological aim: to illuminate how words, when listened to with care, become sites of lived experience and theological depth. Through this multilingual, intertextual weaving, Chrétien constructs a space that is unmistakably European in its cultural lineage, yet open to the universal dimensions of spiritual life. The small book thus positions itself not only as a contribution to philosophy or theology, but also as a work of cultural memory, echoing the shared breath of Europe’s literary, mystical, and philosophical traditions.

Although Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath is among Chrétien’s more lyrical and accessible works, it remains firmly grounded in the philosophical commitments that shape his wider corpus. At the heart of Chrétien’s thought is the idea that human existence is fundamentally structured as response: we are not self-originating subjects but beings addressed by the world, by others, by God, and constituted in our capacity to answer. This response is not reducible to verbal or intellectual articulation; it is enacted through the body, and especially through the voice, which Chrétien in his La Voix nue (2007) has described as the site where interiority is exposed, offered, and made vulnerable. The voice is not a neutral instrument of expression; it is the manifestation of the self in its vulnerability. Unlike writing, which can be revised or deferred, the voice is immediate, ephemeral, and exposed. It gives the speaker before any content is communicated.

Breath, then, is not only physiological but metaphysical; it is the silent precondition of all voice, all responsibility, all praise. Each meditation in this volume can be seen as a variation on this theme: the human person as appelé à répondre, called to respond. Whether in attention, abandon, or blessing, the author emphasizes that we do not initiate meaning or mastery; we listen, receive, and offer ourselves in return. His phenomenology resists the ideal of sovereign subjectivity in favor of a relational approach in which being human means having been addressed first. This commitment aligns him with other figures associated with the so-called “theological turn” in French phenomenology, but Chrétien distinguishes himself by placing emphasis not on concepts like the invisible or the saturated phenomenon, but on the embodied, voiced, and prayed experience of being touched by transcendence. In this sense, Ten Meditations does not diverge from his more explicitly theoretical works as it enacts them, allowing his philosophy to take on a liturgical and poetic form.

The book does not fit neatly into any single genre or discipline. It is neither a philosophical treatise nor a theological tract; neither a devotional manual nor simply a collection of essays. It is all of these and more. Rooted in phenomenology, it adopts the stylistic cadence of spiritual writing. Its rigor lies in fidelity to lived experience, not conceptual closure. For this reason, it resists easy classification but rewards deep attention. Like the best of the mystical and poetic traditions from which it draws, its authority arises not from argument but from resonance.

A particularly illuminating insight into Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath comes from Andrew Prevot[1], who proposes that Chrétien’s meditations are not merely about prayer but are themselves a form of prayer or, more precisely, a text that invites the reader into a posture of prayer. According to Prevot, Chrétien’s style of writing, with its peculiar rhythm, tone, and theological poetics, functions analogously to lectio divina, the traditional Christian practice of slow, meditative, receptive reading of Scripture. Chrétien’s prose does not proceed by systematic demonstration or argumentative clarity; instead, it unfolds contemplatively, circling around key spiritual words such as souffle (breath), recueillement (recollection), bénédiction (blessing), and blessure (wound). These meditations are phenomenological in method, but liturgical in spirit, drawing the reader into a rhythm of interior attentiveness and affective response.

This rhythm is not incidental. As Chrétien makes clear in the opening meditation, which is also the one that inspires the title, breathing is not only a biological act but a spiritual posture. To breathe is to receive life from beyond oneself, to exist in openness, exposure, and dependency. The movement between catching one’s breath and losing it is not merely physiological, but theological: it names the structure of spiritual existence, in which one receives (grace, word, silence) and responds (in prayer, love, or abandonment). Chrétien’s meditations unfold this structure across ten variations, each tracing a movement from interiority to gift, from attention to response, from wound to song. His words operate in this sense not only as analysis but as invitation: the reader is called not to evaluate them critically from a distance, but to enter into them, to pray them, to let them reorder one’s breath.

Prevot highlights this feature with remarkable clarity: “Chrétien’s works are also spiritually edifying. They invite one not merely to think but to pray with them. Indeed, I believe it would be possible to turn to Chrétien as a spiritual guide, to go on a personal retreat structured by his books (perhaps especially the ten meditations in Pour reprendre et perdre haleine)”.[2] What Chrétien offers, then, is not simply a theory of prayer, but a form of philosophical praying, a writing that breathes with the cadences of invocation, silence, and praise. The language of the book is saturated with Scripture, poetry, and theological resonance, but it is never dogmatic or didactic. Instead, it is polyphonic and contemplative, weaving the reader into a web of listening. For Chrétien, as Prevot stresses, prayer is not a private act but a choral response to divine excess. This choral dimension is crucial: to pray is always to pray with others, even in solitude. Chrétien’s prose, by echoing voices from biblical characters, medieval mystics or modern poets, places the reader inside this community of response, and asks them to breathe in its rhythm.

This makes Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath a unique and remarkable work in the phenomenological tradition. It is a book that not only interprets spiritual experience, but that becomes spiritual experience, a kind of literary liturgy, a textual prayer. It does not aim at conceptual mastery but at spiritual transformation, leading the reader gently but insistently toward a more attentive, wounded, recollected, and surrendered existence. To read it, as Prevot notes, is to discover that “Chrétien has given us the gift of thinking prayer and praying thought.” The text breathes, and invites the reader to breathe with it—to catch one’s breath in wonder, and to lose it in love.

The rhythm named in the title – to catch and to lose one’s breath – is more than a poetic flourish; it is the structural and spiritual heart of the book. Chrétien uses this double movement to articulate a phenomenology of contemplation and self-gift. Reprendre haleine, to catch one’s breath, names the moment of interior gathering, a pause of attention and recollection in which one prepares to speak, to listen, or to act. This inhalation is not idle; it is a way of opening the self to receive what is given: from language, from others, from God. It is the very posture of prayer, of philosophical meditation, of poetic readiness. But Chrétien does not allow this moment to close in on itself. Each meditation ultimately gestures toward perdre haleine, losing one’s breath, which signifies not exhaustion but generous expenditure, surrender, and praise. The breath that is recollected in silence is given back in song, in blessing, in abandonment. The highest breath, Chrétien suggests, is not the one we keep, but the one we offer. This rhythm animates the entire progression of the meditations, from the elemental fragility of breath to the sharp exposure of the wound. Contemplation is not the opposite of action; it is its condition and its source. In this light, the book’s structure mirrors the logic of the gift: what is most interior becomes most truly itself when given away. In this, Chrétien articulates not only a phenomenology of prayer, but a vision of human existence grounded in receptivity and generosity: a life lived between the breath we receive and the breath we return.

It is fitting that the final meditation in the series is dedicated to blessure (wound). If souffle (breath) introduces us to our dependence, our need to receive life and meaning from beyond ourselves, blessure brings that vulnerability to its highest intensity. The wound is where the breath falters, where speech breaks, and where the self is opened, often involuntarily, to what exceeds it. Chrétien does not romanticize suffering, but neither does he treat the wound as merely a deficit to be healed. Rather, he sees in it a site of revelation and transformation. The wound is the mark of having been touched by love, by grief, by God, and it is often in the wound that the deepest form of prayer emerges: the silent cry, the sigh, the breath that can no longer be held. This final meditation gathers all the others by showing that every moment of attention, recollection, and blessing ultimately leads to a place where we are undone, not annihilated, but rendered porous to grace. The breath we have received and given finds its limit here, but also its completion. In the wound, Chrétien suggests, we are most exposed and most available to the divine. This is not the culmination of a dialectic, but the intensification of a rhythm: breath given, breath lost, self offered. The meditation on blessure thus brings the reader to the edge of voice, where silence is no longer absence but a form of communion—a shared fragility that opens onto transcendence.

Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath is not only a work by Jean-Louis Chrétien. It is also a translation of his work by Steven DeLay, a novelist and philosopher himself. Translating Chrétien is no small task: his prose is dense with theological, philosophical, and poetic resonances; his style favors nuance, rhythm, and allusion over clarity and conciseness. Yet DeLay manages to preserve the contemplative cadence of the original French while rendering the text in an English that is both faithful and fluid. His translation succeeds not only in accuracy but in tone, and it breathes with the same reflective pace and reverent attention that mark Chrétien’s voice. Moreover, DeLay’s editorial presence enhances the volume in subtle but significant ways. His editorial footnotes, which were absent from the original French edition, serve to clarify linguistic choices, point the reader to relevant works by Chrétien, and provide essential theological or philosophical context where needed. These notes are never intrusive; rather, they assist the reader in navigating Chrétien’s references and concepts without disrupting the meditative flow. Importantly, in the Translator’s Introduction, DeLay recounts how this project began with Chrétien himself, who, the first time they met in 2017, among almost thirty published works, selected Pour reprendre et perdre haleine as the book he most wished to see translated by DeLay. This personal invitation adds a layer of fidelity and responsibility. DeLay is not only the translator, but the one entrusted by Chrétien to carry this particular voice across into English. In this sense, DeLay’s work goes beyond translation: it is a form of interpretive accompaniment, making the text more accessible to Anglophone readers while preserving its depth and integrity. In doing so, DeLay not only brings this important work into the hands of English-speaking readers, but also contributes meaningfully to the growing reception of Chrétien as a central figure in contemporary phenomenological theology, one whose voice, now more audible across linguistic boundaries, continues to challenge, console, and inspire.

The volume also includes a brief but illuminating foreword by Emmanuel Housset, one of Chrétien’s closest students and collaborators. Housset situates the book within the broader arc of Chrétien’s life and thought, and reads it as a “reminder of philosophy’s indebtedness to words. For it is in words that we think, it is also words that make us think”. (p. ix)

Taken as a whole, Ten Meditations for Catching and Losing One’s Breath is not a loosely connected sequence of spiritual essays, but a tightly woven theological and phenomenological meditation on what it means to live a life of attention, receptivity, and self-offering. It exemplifies Chrétien’s distinctive voice within the landscape of French phenomenology, a voice that insists on the primacy of response over initiative, of listening over mastery, of vulnerability over control. More quietly than his overtly theoretical works, this book nonetheless enacts many of the central motifs of Chrétien’s philosophical project: the structure of call and response, the exposure of the self through the voice, the liturgical nature of human embodiment, and the ethical demand that arises from being addressed. The meditations are phenomenological not because they analyze phenomena as such, but because they dwell in the phenomena of prayer, praise, recollection, and fragility without reducing them to abstract categories. In doing so, Chrétien gives us a rare kind of writing, at once philosophical and poetic, theological and personal, rigorous and prayerful. It is a book that does not merely speak about the breath; it breathes. And in doing so, it invites us to breathe with it, to catch our breath in silence and contemplation, and to lose it in love and praise.

 

Bibliography

 

Chrétien, Jean-Louis. La Voix nue: phénoménologie de la promesse. Paris: Minuit, 1990.

Chrétien, Jean-Louis. La Joie spacieuse: essai sur la dilatation. Paris: Minuit, 2007.

Chrétien, Jean-Louis. Saint Augustin et les actes de parole. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002.

Bloechl, Jeffrey. Fragility and Transcendence : Essays on the Thought of Jean-Louis Chrétien. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023.

Gonzales, Philip John Paul, and McMeans, Joseph Micah (eds). Finitude’s Wounded Praise: Responses to Jean-Louis Chrétien. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2023.

Peruzzotti, Francesca. “Human Spirituality: Jean-Louis Chrétien and the Vital Side of Speech” in Religions n. 7, vol .12 (2021), p. 511.


[1] Andrew Prevot, “Praying with Jean-Louis Chrétien,” in Geffrey Bloechl (Ed.) Fragility and Transcendence, Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 117-129.

[2] Ibid, p. 118.

Susi Ferrarello, Christos Hadjioannou (Eds.): The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness, Routledge, 2023






The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness Book Cover




The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness





Susi Ferrarello, Christos Hadjioannou (Eds.)





Routledge




2023




Hardback




542 Pages 4 B/W Illustrations

Jorge Montesó Ventura: Interés, atención, verdad. Una aproximación fenomenológica a la atención






Interés, atención, verdad. Una aproximación fenomenológica a la atención Book Cover




Interés, atención, verdad. Una aproximación fenomenológica a la atención




Pensamiento





Jorge Montesó Ventura





Thémata




2019




Paperback 18,00 €




240

Reviewed by: Diego D'Angelo (Universität Würzburg)

Jorge Montesó Ventura delivers with his book Interest, Attention, Truth. A Phenomenological Approach to Attention (all translations in the following are mine) a valuable contribution to ongoing debates on the phenomenology of a particular phenomenon, that is, of attention. In general, phenomenological authors (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Waldenfels, Depraz, Blumenberg, and many others) understand attention as a phenomenon that occurs mostly at the level of perception. Montesó’s book is no exception to this approach, although with some necessary distinctions, since for Montesó attention is also related to truth and to anthropological questions. In what follows, I will try to make this clear by pointing out the main ideas of the book, which could be of interest also for scholars who do not read Spanish.

From the start of the book it emerges clearly that Montesó adopts a perspective on attention which is clearly cognitive: on the very first page of the book it is expressively stated that attention occurs when we “want to know” something (2). This cognitive approach is also clearly visible in the title of the book, which gives attention the central role between interest and truth.

These three concepts (attention, interest, and truth) are also the main concepts of the three parts into which the book is divided, although the first (and longest) part of it deals with attention, which therefore emerges as the leitmotif keeping interest and truth connected together. That this is possible is due precisely to the fact that the author understands attention in a cognitive fashion. Attention is powered by our interest to know truth.

But the stress I lay on the author’s cognitive approach should not be taken as the claim that the author’s view is blurred by a lens that allows him to see only the cognitive aspects of the phenomenon he wants to analyze. Quite the contrary: the cognitive dimension is the starting-point for an analysis that is focused throughout on the human being as such. The enquiry is therefore at once existential, anthropological, and cultural. The book ends with a call for the development, out of a phenomenology of attention, of a philosophy of culture as such.

A word should be said about the meaning of “phenomenology” in this book. The author has already published a monograph dedicated to José Ortega y Gassett, surely the most prominent phenomenological and existential philosopher to write in Spanish (La atención en el piensamento de Ortega y Gassett, Centre D’Estudis Antropològics ACAF, Castellò 2016). And Ortega y Gassett remains the point of reference for the way in which phenomenology must be understood in this newer book as well. This means that we are dealing not so much with a phenomenology in the sense of Husserl, with all the different technical means he developed for the analysis of a pure experience, but with an existential phenomenology mediated by Scheler and by Heidegger. An approach of this kind to the phenomenology of attention is quite unusual and therefore deserves careful engagement.

In the first part of the Book Montesó delivers a balanced reconstruction of some of the most important points in the history of the concept of attention and of its philosophical, but also psychological, analysis. Wherever possible, Montesó complements philosophical insights with the results of empirical research in neurosciences and psychology, although he never precisely discusses the methodological problems related to this way of proceeding. This omission is somewhat problematic. Obviously, the aim of the book is not to provide a general methodological framework, but if the reference to empirical literature is to be more than the simple attempt so “spice up” the philosophical soup, then one should make clear when the recourse to empirical sciences makes sense and when not, at least in a very preliminary and superficial way.

Nevertheless, the attempt to merge phenomenology and empirical sciences is obviously laudable and profitable in many respects. This first part of the book is cleverly designed as the piece-by-piece assembly of the definition of attention; the full definition is delivered after the single parts have been introduced and discussed at length.

“[…] Attention presents itself to us as a singularity of intentionality in its cognitive or understanding capacity, as the token or expression of the tendencies of the subject in its possibilities to apprehend something cognitively. For this, it works like a lighthouse which, requested or solicited, emerges to reality (be it sensible or imaginary) through a systemic mobilization of the body, selecting (voluntarily or automatically) the things on which the light falls, the things it discovers” (104).

As we can see from this definition, attention is conceived in a fairly straightforward way, since – as Merleau-Ponty already pointed out in the Phenomenology of Perception – the use of a spotlight metaphor when discussing attention was already common in the 1940s. If we add the idea that this light not only makes things stand out more clearly from the background but selects those things, we add to the classical metaphor of attention as a spotlight the equally classical view of attention as a selection mechanism, a metaphor that goes back (as Montesó briefly but exhaustively reconstructs) to the work of Broadbent in the 1950s. This selection mechanism can be voluntary or automatic – that is, in the parlance of current research, top-down or bottom-up. Moreover, attention is an entirely cognitive capability and does not create anything but only illuminates things (cf. 70).

However, building on the basis of this classical understanding, the phenomenological and existential approach of Montesó adds that attention is a bodily gesture that expresses and betokens the tendencies of the subject. In this aspect of attention, which Montesó rightly stresses more than many other researchers on this phenomenon, we have two moments, on the one hand the necessary relation of attention to interest, and on the other the necessary relation of attention to corporeality.

Indeed, this point of novelty is also the point that allows Montesó to construct his own narrative about attention. Precisely by diving into the phenomenon of interest, in the second part of the book he is able to stress the fact that attention is always already shaped by the culture in which the active subject is embedded, because culture is one of the most important builders of interests, if not indeed the single most important. Indeed, the world in which we live is shaped, according to Montesó (and to Ortega y Gassett), first of all by the way in which the culture we live in interprets the surrounding things and phenomena. And in this collective act of interpretation, interests play a crucial role and are the real “motivators” of attention: the phenomenon of interest “plays the same role as the fuel that gives energy to the attentional gesture, it is the impetus that moves attention from one part of reality to another” (129). The idea is basically that interest is the “hand that moves the attentional lamp” (41). Attention rises, in the eyes of the author, always on the basis of some previous interest. Against some of the most classical ideas, according to which only the material features of the object attract our attention, Montesó stresses the meaningfulness for our lives that is the basis for interests to be built and therefore for attention to rise and, as the Author says, “come to reality”: “The life-project of the subject activates and deactivates in each case the functioning of attention, thereby creating her own landscape, her own truth” (101).

Through the interest, attention raises and allows the subject to select her own perspective on realty, within which each subject then selects her own “truth”: “the couple interest-attention is responsible for our particular view of the universe” (181). The notion of truth, which is clearly derived from Heidegger’s understanding of truth as Unverborgenheit (cf. 229), remains fairly open and unclear. Montesó seems to understand truth in the sense of discovery. Attention and interest allow the subject to discover the surrounding world in her peculiar way. This way is certainly subject-centered and peculiar, but not therefore already completely relativistic (in the negative sense of the term), since an intersubjectively shared culture functions as the motor of interests and, therefore, of discovery of the surrounding world: “every culture represents a specific regime of attention within which every individual acts as a unique organ of perception” (119). Attention and interest gives rise to the particular Weltanschauung of a particular people in a particular time (cf. 246).

In the end, one could argue that the concept of attention for Montesó is excessively vague and that it encompasses many different phenomena, from the perceptual, to cultural forms of attention, all to way to love (some nice analyses are developed on falling in love and neurasthenia – cf. 218 ff. – following Ortega y Gassett) and so on. But precisely this is one of the most important achievements of this book: keeping together many different ways (many different “cognitive phenomena”, 20; cf. also 41) in which we speak about attention in a view that defines accurately the phenomenon itself, but which also keeps this phenomenon in the broader context of other phenomena without which attention would be incomprehensible, such as interest and the anthropological striving for truth and knowledge. Furthermore, the author seems to explicitly go in that direction and to recognize the (necessary) vagueness of the concept of attention when he states that “everything is attention” (254). And this way of understanding attention as a “constant and unavoidable gesture” (16) reflects the main intuition of Ortega y Gassett on attention: “tell me what you attend to and I’ll tell you who you are” (Ortega y Gassett, quoted on 117).

Uriah Kriegel (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2020






The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Book Cover




The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness





Uriah Kriegel (Ed.)





Oxford University Press




2020




Hardback £110.00




704

Phillip Zarrilli: (Toward) a Phenomenology of Acting, Routledge, 2019






(Toward) a Phenomenology of Acting Book Cover




(Toward) a Phenomenology of Acting





Phillip Zarrilli. Foreword by Evan Thompson





Routledge




2019




Paperback £26.39




304 pages | 51 B/W Illus.