James Kearney: Shakespearean Ethics in Extremity: Phenomenology, Theater, Experience, Oxford University Press, 2025

Shakespearean Ethics in Extremity: Phenomenology, Theater, Experience Book Cover Shakespearean Ethics in Extremity: Phenomenology, Theater, Experience
James Kearney
Oxford University Press
2025
Hardback
272

Bettina G. Bergo: Emmanuel Levinas: Essays on Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Jewish Thought, Brill, 2025

Emmanuel Levinas: Essays on Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Jewish Thought Book Cover Emmanuel Levinas: Essays on Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Jewish Thought
Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Volume: 40
Bettina G. Bergo
Brill
2025
Hardback

Paul Mendes-Flohr (Ed.): A Companion to Martin Buber, The University of Chicago Press, 2025

A Companion to Martin Buber Book Cover A Companion to Martin Buber
Paul Mendes-Flohr (Ed.)
The University of Chicago Press
2025
Hardback
408

Sara Heinämaa: Către o fenomenologie a diferenței sexuale. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, Ratio et Revelatio, 2024

Către o fenomenologie a diferenței sexuale. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir Book Cover Către o fenomenologie a diferenței sexuale. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir
Epoché
Sara Heinämaa. Romanian translation by Raluca Bujor
Ratio et Revelatio
2024
Paperback
278

Michael Barber: Resilience and Responsiveness: Alfred Schutz’s Finite Provinces of Meaning

Resilience and Responsiveness: Alfred Schutz’s Finite Provinces of Meaning Book Cover Resilience and Responsiveness: Alfred Schutz’s Finite Provinces of Meaning
Contributions to Phenomenology (CTPH, volume 129)
Michael Barber
Springer
2024
Hardback
X, 228

Reviewed by: Daniela Griselda López (CONICET, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero)

 

Michael Barber’s Resilience and Responsiveness: Alfred Schutz’s Finite Provinces of Meaning represents a notable contribution to the study of Schutz’s provinces of meaning. Published on the cusp of the 80th anniversary of Schutz’s seminal essay On Multiple Realities, this book holds particular significance, both in light of Barber’s scholarly trajectory and the historical impact of Schutz’s work.

In the first chapter, Barber highlights resilience and responsiveness as central themes in Schutz’s approach, presenting them as pivotal to comprehending the full scope of his work. Although Schutz himself did not explicitly use these terms, Barber argues that the concepts and their implications serve as a powerful interpretive lens for examining his ideas as a whole. In addition, these concepts gain significance in the context of recent debates that address the confrontation between the Schutzian paradigm and other theoretical perspectives.

In this regard, the book engages with recent advances in the field of Schutzian phenomenologically oriented sociology (Chapter 2), which emphasize the notion of “imposed relevances” as a response to the interpretations of Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, and Zygmunt Bauman. These scholars argue that the Schutzian paradigm fails to address issues of coercion and power. Indeed, within the framework of these discussions, the notion of imposed relevances has been revitalized in recent defenses of Schutz’s social and political theory. Here, Barber brings renewed attention to the concept and demonstrates its pervasive and varied nature. Going further, he seeks to show “the often-unseen positive obverse of such relevances, namely, the multiple creative ways in which we come to terms with the panoply of imposed relevances.” According to Barber, reading Schutz does not evoke a prevailing sense of pessimism, as if we were weighed down or defeated by such imposed relevances. Instead, a different factor is consistently at play—one that aligns with the pragmatism Schutz sees as central to everyday life: resilience.

On Imposed Relevances and Resilience

Imposed relevances consist of the events, persons, or objects we encounter that upset our current systems of intrinsic relevances, that is, our preferred ranking of values, which, in conjunction with our systems of typifications, enable us to categorize, organize, and manage everyday life. When we encounter these imposed relevances, we are often compelled to engage with them reflectively in order to come to terms with their impact. Similarly, in political and social life, we continually confront policies, practices, and other human beings that challenge the projects dictated by our intrinsic relevances and impose constraints or limitations upon us. In this context, Barber approaches intrinsic and imposed relevances not as a dichotomy, but as a dialectic, highlighting the dynamic interplay between imposed relevances and what he identifies as resilience. This discussion suggests that imposed relevances must be understood in a broad sense.

The author elucidates this dialectic by examining the varied nature of imposed relevances, beginning with bodily and epistemological engagements with the world. Furthermore, imposed relevances manifest within the eidetic and ontological structures of both the natural and social worlds, as well as in efforts to assert mastery over everyday life. Notably, these imposed relevances encompass spatiotemporal distances and strata that are accessible through movement, interlocutors who are partially comprehensible despite differences, and the boundaries of the everyday life-world, which may be superseded by an attitudinal shift. Of particular interest is the level of coming to terms with the imposed transcendencies of other persons, where gaps between individuals are partially bridged through alternative forms of signification—a process that echoes Schutz’s reflections on the outgroup and the stranger. Culminating this analysis of different transcendencies, Schutz identifies finite provinces of meaning, which, unlike the transcendency of the other still anchored in the everyday life-world, pertain to worlds beyond everyday life.

When encountering imposed relevances, individuals are often compelled to reflectively come to terms with them. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic forced humanity to confront decisions about how to work, which risks to take, and which preventive strategies to implement. Barber argues that adopting finite provinces of meaning in everyday life can be understood as a resilient response to such imposed relevances. For example, when everyday life becomes boring, individuals might enter the province of play; when tragedy strikes a community, they might turn to religious rituals to attribute meaning to their suffering; or when slavery dominates everyday life, oppressed people may resort to folkloric humor as a means to vent their anger against their oppressors. This allows them to resist succumbing to the despair, depression, or submission that slavery typically engenders in its victims. The creation of an institution parallel to slavery—folklore—surrounded by protections against the slave-owners’ desire to crush any resistance, represents a socio-structural way of coming to terms or confronting the institutionally imposed relevances of slavery. Barber asserts that the development of this “para-institution of folklore humor” exemplifies resilience in the face of one of the most brutal systems of control and domination ever devised. As such, the development and engagement with alternative finite provinces of meaning illustrate the intricate interplay between imposed relevances and resilient human responses.

All the provinces of meaning explored by Barber—play, music, ritual, and humor— are explicitly identified by Schutz as distinct realms of meaning. Regarding ritual and humor, Barber revisits his earlier project from his 2017 book, Religion and Humor as Emancipating Provinces of Meaning, with a renewed and focused emphasis on religious and spiritual ritual experiences, as well as African-American folkloric humor. Additionally, he provides a detailed account of two provinces that Schutz only briefly mentioned: play and music.

The Province of Play

After presenting play as a province of meaning in Chapter 3 and demonstrating how play uniquely instantiates the six features of the cognitive style of any province of meaning, Barber proceeds in Chapter 4 to draw out its implications for resilience, everyday life, and ethics. In this chapter, the author addresses the objections that Schutz’s theory of typifications may lead to ossification and “tunnel vision” unless supplemented by spontaneity. In response, Barber highlights Schutz’s comprehensive understanding of imposed relevances and resilience, as well as the role of play as a resource for resisting the sclerotic tendencies raised by this critique. In this regard, he argues that engaging in play itself becomes an act of resistance and resilience against the tendencies of everyday life to excessively regiment the self. The playful process of escaping the imposed relevances of everyday life, only to recreate variations of these relevances within play and subsequently exhibit a recurrent, restless resilience in coming to terms with these new layers of impositions, is also observable in everyday life.

Furthermore, this chapter asserts that play can lay the groundwork for ethical behavior by fostering interactive responsiveness among participants. According to Barber, rather than opposing ethics, Schutz’s view implies that play can serve as a precursor to ethical interactions, encouraging mutual attunement and collaboration as essential components for achieving shared ethical values​​. Barber emphasizes that play promotes a form of ethical sensitivity that, while not reaching the explicit “responsibility” described by Emmanuel Levinas, creates an environment of mutual engagement and attentiveness. Schutz views these interactions as arising from what he calls “imposed relevances”—the meaningful intrusions of others into one’s experience that invite cooperative responsiveness. In play, these interactions are not forced but naturally encourage individuals to attune to one another, fostering “collaboration in the struggle to realize aesthetic and other types of value together.”​ While Schutz does not equate play directly with Levinasian responsibility, Barber suggests that the dynamics of responsiveness in play lay a foundational structure for ethical behavior.

Intersubjectivity and the Experience of Music

Chapters 5 and 6 can be read together or in dialogue, as they complement each other in several respects. Chapter 5 begins with an exploration of the embodied, emotive, and affective aspects of musical experience, positioning music as a finite province of meaning characterized by its unique cognitive style. Building on Schutz’s essay, “Making Music Together,” which analyzes the social interactions inherent in the musical process, the chapter extends Schutz’s insights to deepen the understanding of intersubjectivity. Key implications include the irruption of the “Thou” into our pre-reflective experience, similar to how music affects us mimetically, and the immediate absorption in the other’s temporal flow, where a pure “Thou-orientation” becomes impossible. The chapter also addresses the asymmetrical focus on the other’s communication, both in music and in extended face-to-face interactions, and the difficulty of reflecting on the “we-relationship” without disrupting it. Additionally, it highlights the unique tuning-in to the other as well as the challenges of typifications in capturing the polythetic unfolding of the other’s experiences.

In Chapter 6, Barber builds on the understanding of social relationships developed in the previous chapter to explore a line of inquiry that Schutz himself did not pursue. Whereas Schutz typically describes provinces of meaning by examining each of their six cognitive features in isolation, Barber delves into how these features interact with one another, specifically by examining how non-social features—such as epoché, form of spontaneity, tension of consciousness, sense of self, and temporality—affect the dimension of sociality. Focusing on the provinces of music, play, and everyday life, Barber argues that non-pragmatic finite provinces of meaning foster a form of “responsiveness.” However, he contends that this responsiveness does not reach the level of Levinasian “responsibility.”

Barber notes, though, that certain instances, such as jazz performance, can illustrate the transition from responsiveness to responsibility, as he explores in the final section of the chapter. This possibility of responsiveness and responsibility coinciding, Barber argues, is fully consistent with Levinas’s thought, as he identifies ethical responsibility even in the most mundane situations. In jazz, musicians engage in spontaneous, pre-reflective interactions that go beyond technical responsiveness to each other’s cues. They exhibit what Barber describes as an ethical responsibility—such as when a musician steps in to support or cover for another’s unexpected silence or missed cue. This requires attentiveness and care for each other, reflecting a moral commitment rather than just an aesthetic or performance-based interaction. Jazz players display a unique blend of freedom and ethical attunement, balancing spontaneity with respect and responsibility toward one another. This attunement becomes a type of “jazz etiquette,” in which musicians prioritize the group’s harmony over individual performance, embodying a relational ethic that merges responsiveness with a deeper moral engagement.

Barber intertwines the themes of imposed relevances, resilience, and responsiveness, proposing that the other can function not merely as a disruptive imposition but as a “beneficent imposed relevance.” Drawing on Levinas’s ideas, Barber suggests that while encountering the other might initially seem to threaten one’s intrinsic relevances, it can ultimately promote self-empowerment and ethical growth. Figures like Martin Luther King and Gandhi exemplify this by transforming the threat of death into resilient commitments to justice. Barber extends Levinas’s idea, arguing that imposed relevances, including suffering, can break through self-centered perspectives and promote liberation, grounding one’s identity in ethical responsibility. Rather than viewing imposed relevances solely as threats, Barber encourages considering them as opportunities for reflection and freedom. In this light, even spiritual and communal experiences may act as liberating imposed relevances, guiding individuals toward ethical responsiveness and selfless service.

The Religious/Spiritual Ritual Province: Resil­ience and Responsiveness to Others

Chapter 7 illuminates how the religious ritual province can contribute to the resil­ience and responsiveness to others, which this book claims to be central themes for Schutz. As in previous chapters, Barber focuses on social relationships and extends this analytic method of examining sociality through the lens of other cognitive style elements unique to each province, specifically to the religious province. The chapter begins by comparing ritual to play, discussing similarities and distinctions as widely recognized in anthropology. Barber then focuses on Abrahamic religions, in which communication within rituals involves dialogic exchanges on a bodily level between a personal God and the religious community (the hallmark of ritual). This bodily engagement fosters a form of sociality that extends to relationships outside the ritual setting, promoting empathy and responsibility toward others. Barber highlights how the unique, non-social features of rituals (like bodily movements, symbols, and music) can deepen interpersonal relationships, even with those outside the community. He also examines how non-social features like sensory markers and ritual music create a distinct “province of meaning” that separates ritual from everyday life. He draws a comparison to Husserl’s epoché, noting that ritual symbols such as incense, music, and architecture signal a shift away from pragmatism toward a unique cognitive state that stimulates openness to divine and human interrelations. Ritual music, Barber argues, plays a critical role in shaping intersubjective experiences by synchronizing participants’ internal rhythms, which enhances collective attentiveness and empathy. Barber points out that music in the ritual realm helps effect a break from everyday life, guiding participants into a shared temporal experience distinct from typical social roles. He further explains that rituals create an environment where typical social roles and personal judgments are set aside. For instance, sensory experiences within rituals—like the sound of hymns or visual elements such as candles—help cultivate a shared consciousness, enhancing mutual openness and empathy among participants. In Barber’s words, rituals allow participants “to be touched, beneath the control of the ego” in a way that promotes “communication between interactors” through sensory cues.

Finally, Barber emphasizes how the values cultivated in ritual—humility, respect, and receptiveness—extend beyond the ritual setting, potentially shaping attitudes toward others outside the community. This quality of ritual, which Barber likens to music in its ability to cultivate “attunement to oneself and others,” prepares participants for ethical responsiveness in broader social contexts. A significant theme in this chapter is the anticipation of divine revelation, in which the ritualistic waiting fosters humility and respect. Barber suggests that this expectation can counteract forms of violence often associated with religious and cultural imperialism, as the act of waiting for revelation nurtures respect for all individuals. Additionally, Barber argues that the cognitive style of ritual, particularly through music, helps deepen the sense of resilience and responsiveness—a core theme Schutz associated with meaningful social interactions.

Humor Folklore as a “Counter-Institution”

Chapter 8 focuses on African-American folkloric humor as a response to the oppressive conditions of slavery. Barber explains how this humor, embedded within a distinct finite province of meaning, allowed enslaved individuals to confront the “imposed relevances” of slavery with resilience. Through oral folklore, conducted in a protected, informal space marked by an epoché that excluded slave owners, African-Americans cultivated a unique form of intersubjective responsiveness. Just as in the ritual province, this departure from everyday life—doubly reinforced through music and sensual ritual markers—serves to cut participants off from everyday reality and accentuates the differentiation between the ritual sphere and everyday life. In much the same way, African-American folkloric humor enacts this departure through a triple reinforcement: folkloric boundary markers, a fictional narrative structure, and the humor embedded within the narrative. This creates a protective boundary around the humor, allowing it to flourish within its well-defined province of meaning.

Barber illustrates resilience by examining specific folkloric tales, including one in which a slave humorously outwits his cruel master, symbolizing both resistance and ethical complexity. This humor is not only a mechanism of endurance but also a subtle, covert critique of the institution of slavery. The chapter highlights how such responsiveness in folklore can transition toward ethical responsibility, creating a space where resilience enables solidarity and sustains moral identity despite systemic dehumanization. Barber links this resilience to a Levinasian ethical responsibility, suggesting that humor allowed for a shared understanding and a reimagined sociality among enslaved individuals, even hinting at the ethical transformation of relationships between the oppressed and the oppressors. Humor offered a way to express indignation and create solidarity against the dehumanizing conditions they faced, with folklore acting as a “counter-institution” to the institution of slavery itself.

Phenomenological Intentionality and Looking-Glass Sociality

The conclusion provides a comprehensive synthesis of the book’s central arguments, grounded in Schutz’s phenomenology and his seminal essay “On Multiple Realities.” Barber engages with Schutz’s conceptualization of finite provinces of meaning, emphasizing their dynamic and interconnected nature, and how the non-social features of these provinces affect the social relationships within them, while addressing the relevance of this conceptualization to contemporary discussions on resilience, sociality, and ethics.

Barber highlights how finite provinces of meaning are not static domains but fluid spheres shaped by intentionality, bodily movement, spontaneity, and affect, alongside rationality and theorizing. The transitions between these provinces—such as work, play, dreaming, and religious ritual—demonstrate their interdependence and the transformative possibilities they offer, enriching human understanding through the interplay of cognitive styles and tensions of consciousness.

Central to Barber’s argument is the role of resilience in Schutz’s framework, which is grounded in phenomenological intentionality, demonstrating that imposed relevances do not causally determine our responses. He foregrounds Schutz’s concept of imposed relevances, which arise from external constraints or social interactions. These external factors are not determinative but instead invite individuals to engage in meaning-making processes, with the caveat that whatever imposed relevances impinge upon us, we are not always capable of “overcoming” them.  Resilience, in this sense, emerges as a hallmark of Schutz’s phenomenology, challenging the reductionism of “vulgar pragmatism” by recognizing the depth of conscious life and its capacity to navigate constraints with creativity and adaptability.

The conclusion further explores Schutz’s idea of a “looking-glass sociality.” Barber contrasts this with Sartre’s view, in which relationships often involve objectification, reducing one person to an object of the other’s consciousness. Schutz focuses instead on intersubjective mutuality, in which individuals engage in spontaneous and reciprocal interactions that reflect a shared world of meaning. Schutz depicts interactions more in terms of mutual responsiveness. One partner interacts quickly, spontaneously, and coopera­tively with another, as happens among players, musical performers, ritual participants, or folkloric humorists. Barber emphasizes that Schutz’s idea of “looking-glass sociality” is grounded in responsiveness and mutual understanding rather than domination or subordination.

As a whole, Barber’s work enriches the understanding of Schutz’s legacy by providing nuanced insights into the fluidity of finite provinces of meaning and their profound implications for human agency, resilience, and the ethical dimensions of social life.

 

Oskar Kraus: Die Werttheorien. Geschichte und Kritik: Ausgewählte Werke. Band I, Springer, 2024






Die Werttheorien. Geschichte und Kritik: Ausgewählte Werke. Band I Book Cover




Die Werttheorien. Geschichte und Kritik: Ausgewählte Werke. Band I




Primary Sources in Phenomenology





Oskar Kraus. Edited by Thomas Binder, Hynek Janoušek





Springer




2024




Hardback




IX, 398

Arne Grøn: Thinking with Kierkegaard, De Gruyter, 2023






Thinking with Kierkegaard, De Gruyter, 2023 Book Cover




Thinking with Kierkegaard, De Gruyter, 2023




Volume 44 in the series Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series





Arne Grøn. Edited by Bjarke Mørkøre Stigel Hansen and René Rosfort





De Gruyter




2023




Hardback 134,95 €




Front matter: 52. Main content: 614

Robert Sokolowski: Pictures, Quotations, Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology






Pictures, Quotations, Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology Book Cover




Pictures, Quotations, Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology





Robert Sokolowski





Catholic University of America Press




2022




Paperback $34.95




340

Reviewed by:  Chad Engelland (The University of Dallas)

The fourteen essays in this volume are exercises in what the author terms “applied phenomenology” (ix) in contrast to the formal analyses found in his Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being. The aim of both volumes is to recover the question of being by reclaiming the truth of appearances.

The essays in this book are attempts to describe various ways in which things can appear: as pictured, quoted, measured, distinguished, explained, meant, and referred to, and also as coming to light in moral conduct. The description of each of these forms is made more vivid and exact by being placed alongside the descriptions of the others. And because appearance always involves that which appears and the one to whom it appears, my essays are meant to be not only an analysis of appearance but also a venture into the question of being and a clarification of what we are. (xiii)

The fourteen essays, arranged in six parts, cover central topics of interest to students and specialists in phenomenology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and ethics. Sokolowski exercises a sovereign philosophical voice that plainly and without fuss lays bare the being of things—and in doing so infectiously invites us to do the same.

In the first part on representations in image and in speech, Sokolowski explores ways of referring to absent things as well as to beliefs other than our own. Picturing requires a unique intentional relation that makes present something that is absent. Naming, by contrast, targets something whether present or absent without making it present in any way. Quoting allows us to target things as intended by others so that we can toggle between our own present articulation of things and those of others without, however, necessarily adopting others’ views as our own.

In the second part on coping with intelligibility, Sokolowski reflects on the explanatory power of strategically distinguishing one thing from another: making sense is not principally a matter of argument or dialectic; it is principally a matter of elucidation by identification with the appropriate kind. For example, pictures are other than quotations and sense is other than reference.

In the third part, Sokolowski details the part-whole structure of time and space and considers themes that arise in the ambit of science concerning the intentionality of timing and of measurement. He also includes a rewarding essay on the relation between the complex world in which we live and the exact one arrived at through the idealizations of science.

In the fourth part, Sokolowski turns explicitly to the philosophy of language and develops, in a phenomenological voice, the difference between sense and reference. He argues that we should “exorcise concepts” as nothing more than a baleful prejudice that, while explaining nothing, generates a host of intractable pseudo-problems. Philosophy’s habitual appeal to concepts comes from a continual failure of nerve, a continual failure to realize that we can and do refer to absent things without the mediation of some sort of present mental entity; in fact, the positing of such an entity is a matter of falling prey to what Sokolowski calls a “transcendental mirage,” a matter of thinking something is there when it is not. Instead, we can handle everything about the phenomenon of language by positing a speaker, speaking about something, to someone. The speaker presents something to someone by means of a “slant” on things. Positing concepts undermines the intentional relation to things; slant-talk reestablishes the fact that speaking is at bottom an issue of the presentation of something to someone. Sokolowski’s analysis of referring nicely displays the advantages of the phenomenological method for exploring the intentionality of naming; it defends both the integrity of ordinary ways of reference and the value of philosophical idealizations of the sort operative in mathematical logic.

In the fifth part, Sokolowski attends to the part-whole structure of sentences and images. Grammar signals not only the thoughtful activity of the speaker but also the need for the listener to undertake the same activity to achieve understanding. Despite a surface similarity between words and pictures, they present things with different conditions of satisfaction.

In the sixth and final part, Sokolowski presents a phenomenology of ethical performance, which develops themes from his Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study. Abstraction stands in the way of moral understanding, which is by nature embodied in the very behavior of morally good agents: “To be able to respond to the natural law—indeed to let it become actual as law, to show by one’s actions what can be done, and thus to make others see what should be done—is to be a certain kind of person: not one who simply conforms to things set down, but one who lets the good appear, to himself and to others, in what he does” (291).

With Sokolowski, the practice of philosophy may be fruitfully understood as a matter of explaining or exhibiting intelligibility by means of carefully distinguishing one thing from another, and of doing so for ourselves and each other together. Hypothesized mental entities only gum up our understanding of language and being; exorcising them allows language to spring again to life so that the wonder-inducing operation of presentation and articulation can once again be registered and appreciated. Those who wish to follow concrete paths into the heart of being could not do better than to pick up this illuminating collection. Highly recommended.